英BBC、クライメートゲートに続くは #パンダゲート 、パンダに嫉妬でうんち攻撃の #ペンギンゲート も ― 2011/12/31 00:00
2011年を締めくくるのは、やはり動物ネタ。
海外ツイッター界隈では #パンダゲート で大盛り上がり。
それではみなさま、よいお年を!
<関連記事>
▼「今年の女性」にパンダ、物議 英BBCに批判の声
http://www.47news.jp/CN/201112/CN2011123001001434.html
【ロンドン共同】英BBC放送が29日までに発表した「今年の女性たち」12人の中に、中国から英国の動物園に貸し出された雌のジャイアントパンダが含まれていたことに対し「人間では適格者がいなかったということか」と批判の声が上がっている。
BBCは「明るいニュースとして加えただけで、過去には男性部門で魚を入れたこともある」とのコメントを発表。英国風のユーモアともいえそうだが、これに先立ちBBCが選んだ「今年のスポーツ選手」の最終候補10人が男性ばかりだったこともあり、女性の怒りを買ったようだ。
▼「今年の女性」の1人に雌パンダ、BBCに批判続出
2011年 12月 30日 16:45 JST
http://jp.reuters.com/article/oddlyEnoughNews/idJPTYE7BT02320111230
[ロンドン 29日 ロイター] 英BBC放送が、「今年の女性12人」の1人に今月中国から貸与された雌のパンダを選び、論争を巻き起こしている。BBCは先週、「今年のアスリート」の候補者が全員男性で占められていたことに対しても批判を浴びていた。
雌パンダの「甜甜」は今月4日に四川省成都からエディンバラ動物園に到着して以来、大変な人気ぶりだが、ツイッターなどには甜甜が選ばれたことに対して怒りの声が多数寄せらている。ジョン・プレスコット元副首相は「BBCは『今年のアスリート』に女性を見つけられなかったわけだが、『今年の女性』にはパンダを見つけられたんだ」と投稿。ステラ・クリージー下院議員も「甜甜は何も悪くないが、これは今年の『女性』を選ぶものであって、今年の『動植物の雌』が対象ではない」と書き込んだ。
一方、BBCは声明を発表し、人間以外が選ばれたのは今回が初めてではないとしている。
また同局は、今年4月にウィリアム英王子と結婚したキャサリン妃のウェディングドレスをデザインしたサラ・バートンさんなど、「今年の女性」に選ばれたうちの3人が結婚に関連していることでも批判を浴びている。
▼パンダの客にペンギン糞攻撃、行列が絶えぬあまりの人気に嫉妬した?
2011年12月29日(木)11時31分配信
http://news.nicovideo.jp/watch/nw171044
その愛らしい表情・仕草や希少性などから世界的にも人気のパンダは、どこの動物園でも大人気。12月4日、英国のエジンバラ動物園にも、同国17年ぶりとなる待望のパンダが2頭到着し、16日からは一般公開も始まった。公開早々、飼育舎の前には一目見ようとする人たちの長蛇の列が出来るなど英国の人々を虜にしているそうだが、このパンダの人気に予期せぬ問題が発生したという。問題の主は、それまで動物園の人気を支えてきたペンギンたちだ。
英放送局BBCや英紙スコティッシュ・デイリーレコードなどによると、パンダの公開によって作られた長い行列に対し、ペンギンたちが突如反旗を翻したかのようにフンで攻撃する事例が発生。18日にはフンがジャケットに当たり、驚いて声を上げている人がいたという目撃情報があるほか、パンダを見に動物園を訪れた41歳の男性の近くにもフンが飛来し、「油っぽくて魚の匂いがした」(BBCより)という。この一件により男性は「見物客が当たらないように、動物園は対策を講じるべきだ」と指摘している。
問題のペンギンたちは、25万ポンド(約3,045万円)をかけて新たに建設されたパンダ舎の隣にある飼育舎で生活。そのため好奇心旺盛なペンギンたちは、急に忙しくなったパンダ舎がずっと気になっていたようで、「何が起きているのか見ようと」壁に沿って集まっている様子がよく見られたという。そしてパンダ公開と共に出来た行列がペンギン舎の近くにも伸びると、突然彼らはその人たちに対してフンで攻撃する行動を取り始めたそうだ。
こうしたペンギンたちの行動に対して、エジンバラ動物園職員のゲイリー・ウィルソンさんは「嫉妬からの行動ではないと良いんだけど」と少し不安な様子。というのもエジンバラ動物園のペンギンたちは、これまで定点カメラ映像がインターネット上で公開され話題になるなど、園で飼育される動物の中でもひときわ注目を集めてきた存在で、ウィルソンさんは人々の視線がパンダにシフトしたことに嫉妬を感じているのではないか……と気になっているようだ。
エジンバラ動物園にとっては「5年間の努力」(スコティッシュ・デイリーレコード紙より)の末にやっと貸与が認められ、実現にこぎ着けたパンダの公開。初日には「1万人がチケットを予約」するなど、入場者数が昨年比2倍の伸びを見せるほどのパンダ人気に、ペンギンたちだけはどうも納得がいかないのかもしれない。
現在のところ、“フン攻撃”を笑って流す客も少なくないそうだが、動物園側はペンギンの飼育舎に透明のガラスパネルを設置し、客が被害を受けないような対策を検討しているという。
BBC News - Faces of the year 2011 - the women (画像引用)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16200429
BBC chooses a panda as one of the 12 female faces of 2011 #pandagate
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/bbc-chooses-a-panda-as-one-of-the-12-female-faces-of-2011-pandagate/2011/12/28/gIQAkD4NMP_blog.html
Pandagate: Sweetie appears among the BBC's female faces of the year
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/28/pandagate_sweetie_appears_among_the_bbcs_female_faces_of_the_year
Penguin droppings hit panda queue at Edinburgh Zoo #penguingate
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-16270214
Jealous penguins pelt poo at Edinburgh Zoo visitors #penguingate
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/travel/news/jealous-penguins-pelt-poo-at-edinburgh-zoo-panda-watchers/story-e6frg8ro-1226227540063
お薦め記事: A World of Risk in 2012 - Nader Mousavizadeh Interview ― 2011/12/25 09:36
Interview
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 2011
A World of Risk in 2012
By LESLIE P. NORTON
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748703679304577108620134996912.html?mod=BOL_hpp_mag#articleTabs_article%3D0
In a wide-ranging interview with Barron's, Oxford Analytica CEO Nader Mousavizadeh tells us how global political and economic events should inform investment strategies for the coming year.
"Due diligence of the macro kind has never been so important as in 2011 and 2012," says the chief executive of Oxford Analytica. A quick glance at last week's headlines explains why: The alarming compendium included the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il, renewed rioting in Egypt just a few months after the Arab Spring, fresh trade wars, and the unsettling prospect of cyber attacks as Chinese hackers broke into U.S. Chamber of Commerce computers. A former Goldman Sachs banker and United Nations official, Mousavizadeh runs the well-regarded Oxford, England-based strategic-analysis firm, and is an excellent candidate to assess one side of the risk/reward tradeoff. To learn his views, keep reading.
Barron's: What does Kim Jong-Il's death mean? Will we see rapprochement, or more missile attacks?
Mousavizadeh: There are a few key issues. The succession was planned by the North Korean regime, and it has been known for some time that the son of Kim Jong-Il would succeed the father. Second, as much as the leadership was personalized by Kim Jong-Il and is now handed to the son, it is a military regime run by a military committee that should be seen in a broader context: It is very, very focused on maintaining its grip on power. Third, the regime thrives on a state of war with the outside world. Some kind of provocative activity, much as the father engaged in at various times when he thought that was useful to him, is to be expected. We are looking for increased tension in relations between North Korea and the South and Japan, as well as the U.S., in the next 12 months. It accords with their continuing sense of a state of siege.
"Clearly Western governments are focused on what they see as an enormous amount of cyber activity coming from China." -- Nader Mousavizadeh
.
Will the well-known Korea discount expand?
I would think so, yes. The son is untested, young, and it is not clear that he has the status that his father would have wanted. The overall risk picture around Korea has gone up as part of this transition.
You coined the term "global archipelago." What does it mean?
When the West came out of the Cold War, the expectation was of "the end of history," and of one model of broadly free markets, and that governments would all end at the same destination, even if some took longer to get there. Everyone pretty much wanted to get to where we are in the West.
What the last decade has shown, which was accelerated by various events—including the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 9/11, and the global financial crisis leading to the euro-zone crisis—was a couple of very important forces that made us question whether that end is likely or even desired. Over the last 25 years, you saw the relative decline of U.S. economic and political dominance.
A number of countries rethought their own economic and political models, whether Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Russia, or African countries. The combination of increased political independence, stronger economies driven by commodity flows, structural drivers from China, and the failures of a lot of Western development models to deliver either growth or equality for a lot of emerging markets, have led a number of countries to redesign how they govern themselves. I use the term "archipelago" because of the fragmentation of power, capital and ideas. There will be more distinct voices, all of which feel they have a reason to be heard, and interests they can now defend because they are economically stronger than 20 years ago.
For investors, this means a much larger role for the state. You will see more use of state-owned entities, state backing for national champions, state activism on trade and investment. We are used to seeing it from China and Korea, but you are going to see it more from Europe, from Britain and Finland.
Clearly we will see more trade protectionism. The fragmented archipelago is also a reflection, by the way, of the failure of some of the big global universal attempts to regulate either emissions or trade. You will see dozens of new bilateral agreements instead of the World Trade Organization being the only place that secures those interests.
What big risks do investors face in 2012?
The main risk, from an economic perspective, is a disorderly collapse of the euro zone and the common currency. The basic political division is around how unified fiscal and other policies should be. The recent agreement among the 26 governments had two problems. One is that it is too small. Two is that each of these 26 governments needs to go and get democratic popular support and endorse the shift in authority to Brussels.
No one thinks this will actually happen. Because of the lack of credibility around Greece, European leaders can't convince markets that Spain or Italy can come out of the danger zone. So at this point, even if you don't believe the European Central Bank should be the lender of last resort for the banks, which it is, and the sovereigns, which it isn't, the markets believe that unless the ECB takes that role, you can't build a strong enough firewall in Europe. Yields will go up as a function of that lack of confidence.
What do the euro zone and the euro look like in December 2012?
There's an 80% chance the euro zone looks different. It will include Germany, France, and other core countries that believe in the common currency and can create credibility about their economic and fiscal discipline to support it. A number of others, Greece first among them, won't be able to stay. It will be harder for the peripheral countries to justify sacrifices in domestic policies, when there is no end in sight to the austerity programs.
The risk of Greece defaulting and going into the very, very difficult process of converting back to its own currency is high. Italy is much bigger and more important: You will see Germany and France go to great lengths to keep Italy in. But it isn't sustainable for Italy to pay 6.5%, 7% on its debts. At the end of the day, the only way the euro zone has 100% likelihood of staying intact is a shift in the role of the ECB, if it came in and said that was a greater concern than inflation, which is the current core of its mandate.
Obviously, you run the risk of greater inflation by printing more money and buying the markets of the sovereign debtors. But the authority of the ECB could transform perceptions of sovereign risk in Europe. My guess is the euro weakens in 2012.
Is a hard landing in China a concern?
There is every reason to believe the Chinese government will manage its transition to a slightly lower growth profile very successfully. We see continued strong development of the domestic market, a much less leveraged and much less crisis-prone financial sector in China, and increased trade and investment flows between Latin America and Africa and Asia, which allows them to disintermediate Western institutions as export markets and sources of investment.
The risks in China include the leadership change next year. You will see a more assertive China that is soon going to be the largest economy in the world, even as it will have a gross domestic product per capita that is an eighth or ninth of the richest parts of the world. We will, in effect, have two Chinas for a long time to come, and that will lead to decision-making that at some times will seem sensible and at others perplexing.
Another risk is that the political pressures within China come not so much from dissidents like Ai Weiwei, but from a highly connected younger population on the Internet that has a more nationalistic perspective than the Beijing government, more anti-American and anti-Western, pushing the Chinese leadership to be assertive in the world. That is another way the archipelago will manifest.
Do you mean militarily, as in the South China Sea?
The envelope will be pushed on trade issues: You will see more spats about tariffs between other economies and China. You will see the continued "going-out" strategy: More and more large-scale Chinese investments in emerging markets, and some very sizeable Chinese acquisition moves on major Western companies. In terms of companies, the resource space is obvious. Some of the surprises in 2012 will be in other sectors—financial services, consumer areas, technology.
What are the risks from the Middle East?
In 2011, the Arab world went through a once-in-a-generation change. In many ways it caught up with the rest of the world in terms of the force of globalization, technology and the chance to create a political and economic system that can unleash its talents. Now the big challenge is the transition to some form of democratic rule.
In the Arab world, democracy is not intimately associated with economic deprivation and penury of the kind you saw in Russia after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which is a huge reason why [Russian Prime Minister] Putin has had the support he's had for as long as he's had it.
The risk in 2012 for the Arab world is that as they structure democratic, responsive forms of governance, the economic burdens overwhelm them and people think nostalgically of [former Egyptian president] Mubarak or [former Tunisian president] Ben Ali because they could put food on the table. That is a big challenge for the West, which supported Mubarak and these regimes to the tune of billions of dollars. Now these countries are asking themselves if the West will support them now that they are trying to be democratic.
As for the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, it is considered a good thing, although Arab leaders worry whether that means increased influence for Iran. At the leadership level, there is a mixture of peril and paranoia around the role of Iran. That all falls under the biggest worry among Arab leaders now. The future of their region will be determined by three countries that are not Arab: Turkey, Israel, and Iran.
Let's talk about Iran's nuclear program.
The Iranian government claims the program is for civilian uses, but few outsiders believe this. For some time, there has been a concerted, successful policy of sabotaging, delaying, and disrupting this program. The U.S., Israel and others are believed to be involved, and the efforts have succeeded so far, in that Iran has not crossed the nuclear threshold.
The key risk is that in Israel, important elements of the leadership do not believe the West has either the will or the capability to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. If you combine this view with a sense that the change sweeping the Arab world is a source of instability and hostility to Israel, and that an Iranian nuclear capability will so substantially change the power balance in the region as to make their own strategic position unviable, then the risk of military action goes up in 2012.
The current relations between Israel and the U.S. contain a very strong element of distrust at the very senior leadership level, between [Israeli Premier] Netanyahu and [President] Obama. That might contribute to a decision to take military action. This comes at a time when Iran's position is substantially weakened. When the Assad regime falls, Iran will lose its only ally in the Arab world, Syria.
The final piece, as we know from the 2009 Green Movement, is that the Iranian people do not in any way share the hostility of the regime for the West. These factors all count against the ability of the regime to disrupt Western and Arab strategies, but haven't prevented a heightened state of paranoia and peril.
How likely is military action?
I think it is less than a 20% probability. If it happens, it will happen in the spring because the weather elements make it better to do it then. The U.S. political calendar has an impact. It's unlikely to happen in the initial period after either the President has been reelected or there is a new president.
If it happens, it will be started by Israel, and will draw in the U.S. either immediately or in the medium term. There is a very high risk of it becoming a major war in the region.
From the Iranian perspective, closing the Strait of Hormuz is clearly one of the tools in its arsenal to make the West pay a very high price for an attack. It is highly likely you would see a major disruption in energy supplies and therefore a rise in the price of oil.
Beyond Iran, a conflict will likely affect the standing of a number of key Arab allies. The leadership may support the action, but the people would not. If you go to the Persian Gulf now, people are talking very tough about attacking Iran, which they see as the major destabilizer in the region. But once another major war is started on another Muslim country in the Middle East, popular sentiment is unlikely to hang with the leadership.
There is zero appetite in the U.S. and British governments and militaries for a war with Iran.
You are also concerned about cyber attacks.
Over the last 10 years, you've seen the Pentagon establish a cyber command and spend enormous resources to counter cyber attacks. The attempts to delay the Iranian nuclear program include cyberware, the Stuxnet virus. We have reached the stage where the technology is advanced, and both state and nonstate actors have the ability to launch an attack on a private or government institution.
It isn't lack of capability that has prevented such an attack. One of the peculiarities is, we may never know when it starts or who started it. You may simply see a major technological failure at a Western institution. Clearly, Western governments and institutions are focused on what they see as an enormous amount of cyber activity coming from China, whether government-backed or not. You will see the threat matrix multiply on the risk of an actual successful attack of meaningful size in 2012.
Thanks, Nader.
日経:野田首相、面会上位に側近議員 官僚は外務・財務 ― 2011/12/11 09:56
<関連記事引用(画像も)>
野田首相、面会上位に側近議員 官僚は外務・財務
2011/12/10 23:48
http://s.nikkei.com/s4OSAG
野田政権は10日で発足100日を迎えた。この間に野田佳彦首相と面会した政治家をみると、上位は側近議員の名前がずらりと並ぶ。官僚は外務省や財務省の幹部が官邸をしばしば訪れている。
面会した政治家の上位は手塚仁雄首相補佐官、藤村修官房長官、長浜博行官房副長官ら。首相官邸に常駐する「地の利」に加え、首相とは気心が知れた間柄という事情もある。民主党側は輿石東幹事長が28回で首位だ。
官僚では事務のトップの竹歳誠官房副長官に次いで、警察庁出身の植松信一内閣情報官が2位に入った。国際情勢など様々な情報を定期的に報告しており、首相とは一対一で会うことが多い。
外務省の佐々江賢一郎次官や杉山晋輔アジア大洋州局長らも首相と2人きりで面会する機会がある。財務省は勝栄二郎次官らの姿が目立つ。欧州の債務危機を受け、中尾武彦財務官や木下康司国際局長の報告も増えた。
「政治主導」を掲げた民主党政権は当初、首相が官僚と会うときは政務三役の同席を義務付けていた。菅政権で慣例は崩れ、野田政権は官僚との距離がさらに近づいた。
The US navy fostered globalisation: we still need it - Robert Kaplan ― 2011/11/30 19:54
<関連記事引用>
November 29, 2011 7:10 pm
The US navy fostered globalisation: we still need it
By Robert Kaplan
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f9d59564-19b7-11e1-ba5d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1eskLmmRu
The financial world is obsessed with stock market gyrations and bond yields. But the numbers that matter in the long run are those of US warships. Asia has been at the centre of the world economy for decades because security there can be taken for granted, and that is only because of the dominance of the US navy and air force in the western Pacific. Because 90 per cent of all commercial goods traded between continents travel by sea, the US navy, which does more than any other entity to protect these lines of communication, is responsible for globalisation as we know it.
There is no guarantee that this situation will last, however. In the 1980s era of high Reaganism, the US navy boasted close to 600 warships. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, that number fell to about 350. The US navy’s current strength is 284 warships. In the short term that number may rise to 313 because of the introduction of littoral combat ships. Over time, however, it may fall to about 250, owing to cost overruns, the need to address domestic debt and the decommissioning of ageing warships in the 2020s. Meanwhile, the bipartisan quadrennial defence review last year recommended that the US move toward a 346-ship navy to fulfil its global responsibilities.
There is a big difference between a 346-ship US navy and a 250-ship navy – the difference between one kind of world order and another.
Armies respond to unexpected contingencies, but it is navies and air forces that project power. Power is relative. If other nations were not building up their own navies and air forces, these numbers would matter less than they do. In fact, the western Pacific is in the middle of an arms race. This is not a low-tech expansion of ground forces; but a high-tech acquisition of submarines, surface warships, fighter jets, missiles, and cyberwarfare capabilities. The US armed forces have rarely been needed more to preserve the balance of power, and so maintain a peaceful environment for economic interaction.
China is increasing its submarine fleet from 62 to 77 – surpassing the size, if not the quality, of America’s own undersea fleet – even as Beijing acquires hundreds of fourth- and fifth-generation fighter jets. Meanwhile, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are acquiring submarines, as advances in missile technology make surface warships more vulnerable. Australia, with a population of only 23m, is expected to spend a whopping $279bn in the next two decades on new subs, destroyers and fighter planes. In all, given military modernisation programmes under way in South Korea and Japan, Asian nations are expected to purchase as many as 111 submarines by 2030, according to AMI International, a research outfit for governments and shipbuilders.
Multipolar military orders are more unstable than unipolar ones because there are more points of interaction where miscalculations can occur. Yet unless the US is able to maintain a vigorous naval and air presence in the Indo-Pacific, the future of military power arrangements will be more multipolar.
A world without US naval and air dominance will be one where powers such as China, Russia, India, Japan and others act more aggressively towards each other than they do now because they will all be far more insecure than they are now. Even China and Russia take advantage of secure sea lanes partly provided by the US.
An Indo-Pacific without a strong US military presence would mean the Finlandisation by China of countries in the South China Sea, such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. Indeed, Beijing, with its economic might and geographical proximity, may be less benign to its southern neighbours than has been the distant and democratic US.
Now that the congressional supercommittee in Washington has failed to achieve a compromise, the debt crisis may force historic cuts on the US navy and air force, resulting in fewer warships and curtailment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme. The business community should hope that it does not happen.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and author of ‘Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power’
各国のチョークポイント依存度の推移 (エネルギー白書2010より) ― 2011/09/06 06:34
<画像引用>
エネルギー白書2010 - 第1部 第1章 第4節 総合的なエネルギー安全保障の定量評価
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2010energyhtml/1-1-4.html
<関連サイト>
エネルギーに関する年次報告(2010年版エネルギー白書)概要
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2010/2010_gaiyou.pdf
極めて重要なめものメモ FT: Cyber threats can unite Japan and America より ― 2010/08/30 23:20
<関連記事引用>
Cyber threats can unite Japan and America
By John Alkire
Published: August 29 2010 23:21 | Last updated: August 29 2010 23:21
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/88d7b634-b398-11df-81aa-00144feabdc0.html
Striking developments in the relationship between America and Japan suggest that a new type of strategic alliance is brewing. In particular, a series of seemingly unrelated events point to important shifts that could have significant implications for both countries as they contemplate an era of sophisticated electronic warfare.
Fifty years after Japan and the US signed their treaty of mutual co-operation, Barney Frank, US congressman, in July described the stationing of US forces in Okinawa as a hangover from the second world war. Shortly after, John Roos, US ambassador to Japan, became the first American envoy to join the annual commemoration of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Then, Naoto Kan became the first Japanese prime minister in 25 years to instruct his cabinet to stay away from the annual event honouring Japan’s war dead, at the Yasukuni shrine.
Not only does all this suggest the strengthening of an old alliance, it also points to new possibilities for co-operation. Under their security treaty, the US and Japan agreed to help each other in the event of an attack on either side, although Japan’s pacifist constitution forbids it from having an active military. Yet military hardware, so essential for security 50 years ago, is no longer the only form of security threat that matters. Cyber security now requires equal attention.
Cyber attacks on national infrastructure and financial systems have become an ever-present danger, as the Pentagon admitted last week when it acknowledged that a 2008 cyber attack in the Middle East had compromised secret US military computers. Such issues can provide new common ground between the US and Japan.
For one thing, both share a common threat. Since 1998 China has spent billions on its “golden shield” firewall. After Google accused Beijing of official interference with its services, Julius Genachowski, chairman of the US Federal Communications Commission, and Kazuhiro Haraguchi, Japan’s minister of communications, met in May to discuss cybersecurity issues. The talks came as the US government began publicly warning China about its cyber-espionage activities. The US allegations included charges that a Chinese computer spying network, called “GhostNet”, had stolen sensitive information from thousands of hard drives, although China denied involvement.
Both Japan, with its many key high-tech industries, and the US, with enterprises clamouring for Chinese market opportunities, are clearly concerned about cyber threats. In their May meeting, officials from both nations agreed to work jointly to stop cyber-based attacks on their respective businesses and governments, and to lead discussions on this topic at an international meeting of Asia-Pacific telecommunications ministers this October on Japan’s southern island of Okinawa.
Such new types of co-operation would amount to a high-tech version of the traditional military security treaty that the two countries put in place 50 years ago. They highlight a recognition of radical changes in the nature of security threats, and signal a move towards more appropriate, modern shields.
Given America’s challenges of maintaining military spending amid fiscal budgetary constraints and Japan’s constitutional restrictions on military activity, still-greater cyber co-operation – though not a substitute for traditional military security – offers a vital opportunity for both nations to renew their security alliance. It is an alliance from which both parties stand to benefit.
Three-quarters of US military hardware in Japan is located on Okinawa, a fact that has caused tensions in the bilateral relationship and fuelled calls for the complete removal of the bases. Both countries agree it is critical to resolve these issues, although opposition to plans to relocate the bases within the area, focused on the Futenma marine corps base on Okinawa, helped to bring down the Hatoyama government this year.
One way to resolve such thorny issues while addressing broader security concerns would be to change the focus of co-operation still further towards cyber-threats. A new virtuous bilateral partnership, including the sharing of costs for such co-operation in Okinawa, could provide an elegant solution to the issue of outdated military bases, while fostering productive ties between the two countries.
Converting some existing installations in Okinawa into US-Japan cybersecurity centres would create vital technological buffers, while increasing economic and public safety from faceless cyberterrorists, electronic spies and online criminals. After all, as Barney Frank noted: “No one thinks you’re going to land 15,000 marines on the Chinese mainland to confront millions of Chinese military.” What could result is a truly contemporary security partnership, fit for the next 50 years.
The writer is managing director of Morgan Stanley Japan
Silvio Gesell, Willem Buiter, Sweden : Fed needs firepower to zap deflation monster ― 2010/08/14 14:14
<関連記事引用>
Fed needs firepower to zap deflation monster
By James Mackintosh
Published: August 13 2010 20:17 | Last updated: August 13 2010 20:17
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fbb74668-a70b-11df-90e5-00144feabdc0.html
Every action film script has the hero running out of bullets at a crucial moment and reaching for whatever weapon comes to hand. Ben Bernanke may not have the pecs of Jean-Claude Van Damme, but the Federal Reserve chairman signalled this week he was willing to bash away with a baseball bat if that is what it takes to keep the economy going.
The US central bank has already cast aside its main weapon, interest rates, having slashed it to zero in the wake of Lehman Brothers’ collapse. On Tuesday, it reloaded its backup, quantitative easing – think Sigourney Weaver switching from pulse rifle to flamethrower in Aliens.
Unfortunately, the markets took the wrong message. Rather than being reassured that the deflation monster had a fight on its hands, investors decided to flee. Bad news on the economy in the US and China and renewed worries about the eurozone’s troubled periphery and European banks made matters worse. The nascent summer rally in equities came to a painful end, bonds rose and market inflation expectations tumbled.
Which raises the vital question: is the Fed firing blanks? Certainly, inflation is now expected to be lower – the Treasury futures market measure of implied inflation had its biggest one-day fall since the height of the Greek crisis. In Germany, bond markets are pricing average inflation of 0.78 per cent over the next five years, the lowest since the depths of the crisis last March. In the US, inflation is expected to average 1.67 per cent over the next 10 years, the lowest since September. Yet, investors still have faith in the ability of the authorities to prevent deflation. The belief is that printing money to buy assets such as Treasury bonds – quantitative easing – is bound to lead to inflation eventually, which is why the bond markets are not pricing in deflation. It is true that at some point printing money creates inflation, since each dollar, pound or euro is worth less in real goods. But extreme use of the printing presses undermines confidence in the currency and disrupts further an already distorted economy.
If I sound sceptical, it is not just because my British accent would automatically cast me as a villain in Hollywood. The Fed has already pumped more money into its quantitative easing than Japan, home of the deflation monster, has in the past 20 years. The result? The US has one of the weakest recoveries ever and deflation is still a risk. Of course, had it done nothing, we would probably be in depression.
What is certain is that unconventional monetary tools are back on the table, and not just in the US. For bond, equity and currency investors, this is a vital consideration. Switzerland remains on the cusp of deflation, in spite of the Swiss National Bank’s massive minting of new francs to buy euros, which saw it record embarrassing losses this year. Even the hawkish European Central Bank is rumoured to be intervening again, supposedly buying Irish government bonds.
The problem is that central banks alone cannot replace the banking system, and bank lending is barely recovering. Indeed, broad money is still shrinking in the US (see chart), as the private sector pays down debt, and is anaemic, to say the least, in the eurozone.
The risk is that helicopter drops of money into the economy from central banks simply lead to more debt reduction and hoarding. To address this, some economists suggest the most extreme measure yet: negative interest rates. This has been tried before, to address a different problem: Switzerland had a nominal -40 per cent rate for foreign deposits in the 1970s to try to avoid capital inflows (that failed).
But if banks faced negative nominal rates for money on deposit at the central bank – now near record levels – that should far more effectively encourage them to lend than exhortations from politicians. This would only be a small step, as rates could go no lower than about -0.25 per cent before it would be worth storing banknotes by the tonne (Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citigroup, has suggested abolishing physical money to solve this problem). There is a precedent. Sweden had a negative rate on excess reserves last year, although it did little since the Swedish banks were functioning normally.
There is one big disadvantage to a negative rate: it would amount to a tax on banks, since the overall level of central bank deposits must remain about the same – like the game of Old Maid, each bank would be trying to pass on the money. Charles Goodhart, an ex-member of the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee, points out that if banks were lending, negative rates would not be needed; they only have themselves to blame.
At the very least, this would hand Mr Bernanke a new weapon. Only by experimenting will we find out if it has the firepower to break deflation.
日経「経済教室」:非伝統的金融政策評価と展望(上)&(下) ― 2010/07/10 08:21
<関連記事引用>
非伝統的金融政策評価と展望(上)専修大学教授田中隆之氏(経済教室)
2010/07/08 日本経済新聞 朝刊
景気刺激、効果薄だが必要 緩和継続、市場に示せ 国債引き受けは「最終手段」
ポイント
○金融政策、危機対応から成長促進の段階へ
○準備供給や信用緩和、景気への効果乏しく
○景気刺激策の「成長基盤強化」には批判も
日銀は、2008年12月以降、コールレートがほぼゼロに達する「ゼロ金利制約」に直面し、金利引き下げという通常の政策手段を失った。その下で繰り出された様々な非伝統的金融政策は2つのフェーズに分けることができる。
第一は、09年12月までの時期で、主にリーマン・ショック後に深刻化した金融システム不安への対策が、政府の対策と並行して打ち出された。第二フェーズは、それ以降現在まで継続中である。09年11月に政府が行ったデフレ宣言に対応する形で、デフレ脱却を意識した景気刺激策・成長促進策が打ち出されている。
中央銀行が行う政策手段は、景気刺激策と金融システム安定化策の、双方の効果を持つ場合が少なくない。しかし、個々の政策手段にどちらの効果がどの程度期待できるのか見極めることは重要であるし、また現実に取られる政策でどちらが主目的なのか認識することも必要だ。こうした観点で非伝統的金融政策を整理し直すと、次のようになろう。
第一は、中央銀行が、市中銀行に所要準備を超える準備預金(超過準備)を供給する政策だ(表の(3))。これを6月4日付本欄の岩本康志東大教授の論考にならい「準備供給政策」と呼ぼう。日本で01年から06年まで行われた量的緩和政策の中心に位置したのがこの手段だ。このとき、当初は景気刺激策としての役割(ポートフォリオ・リバランス効果)が期待されたが、それは大きくはなく、市中銀行の資金繰りを容易にする流動性対策としての金融システム安定化策の役割が大きいことが明らかになった。
第二に、中央銀行が、民間のリスク資産つまり証券類を購入する「信用政策」がある(同(4))。米連邦準備理事会(FRB)は、リーマン・ショック後、住宅ローン担保証券(MBS)、政府関係機関(GSE)債などを市場から買い取ったが、金融システム不安の広がりによる信用収縮、つまりこれらに買い手が付かなくなる事態を解きほぐす役割を持った。バーナンキFRB議長は、この政策を「信用緩和」と呼び、日本の量的緩和が中央銀行のバランスシートの負債側の拡大に重点があったのに対し、資産側の作用に注目した政策であると強調した(ただし、同時に負債側も膨らんだから、この措置は準備供給政策も兼ねた)。
だが景気刺激策としての「緩和」効果ははっきりしない。理論上は、資産価格の上昇による資産効果、リスクプレミアムの低下による金利低下などを通じた刺激効果が考えられるが、それより一般企業の資金繰りを意識した流動性対策、つまり金融システム安定化策としての側面が大きかったことは間違いない。
第三に、市場での短期金利の先行き予想を下げて、長期金利引き下げを図る「時間軸政策」だ(同(5))。量的緩和期の日銀はデフレ脱却まで当時ゼロだったコールレートを引き上げない旨を約束した(政策コミットメント)。その原理は、「長期金利は現在の短期金利と将来各期の短期金利の予測の平均で決まる」という金利の期間構成に関する期待仮説に基づく。これは純然たる景気刺激策だが、今回日銀は行っていない。
第四は、実質金利引き下げを狙うインフレ期待形成策である(同(6))。名目金利はゼロよりも低くならないが、このとき仮に期待インフレ率が2%に上昇すれば、企業が設備投資の目安とする実質金利はマイナス2%に低下する。かつてクルーグマン米プリンストン大教授は、日銀が「将来インフレが来ても金利を上げずにインフレを放置する」と約束することでインフレ期待を形成せよと提案した。
だが「通貨の番人」としての信認の厚い中央銀行ほど、そうした非現実的な約束を市場に信じ込ませるのは難しい。日銀はこれを行わず、今のところその他の中央銀行もこれを行う気配はない。
以上を前提に、リーマン・ショック後の日本の金融政策展開を再検討しよう。まず第一のフェーズでは、日銀は利下げのほか、非伝統的金融政策として準備供給政策と信用政策の双方を行った。特に08年12月導入の企業金融支援特別オペとコマーシャルペーパー(CP)買い入れ、09年2月の社債買い入れという「3点セット」は、企業の資金繰りを意識した流動性対策だった(信用政策)。それは同時に大量の超過準備を市中銀行に供給することになり、市中銀行の流動性対策ともなった(準備供給政策)。なお政府は、同時期に、中小企業向け低利融資、CP買い取りなどを行い、金融機能強化法による銀行の資本増強など、中央銀行が行い得ない支払い機能強化策(ソルベンシー対策)も打ち出した。
第二のフェーズに至り、日銀は信用政策にピリオドを打つ一方、準備供給政策を継続し、新たな景気刺激策を追加しているとみられる。09年12月末から10年3月末にかけて前述の「3点セット」を終了させ、代わりに09年12月初めに当初新型オペと呼ばれた固定金利オペを導入した。
固定金利オペはやや長めの金利(3カ月物)のさらなる低下を促すもので、狙いは景気刺激策だろう。もっとも民間企業信用を担保に政策金利と同じ0・1%で3カ月間の資金を供給する形態には、先の企業金融支援オペとあまり違いがない。つまり固定金利オペは、信用政策の持つ(金融システム安定化効果ではなく)景気刺激効果に期待して打ち出されたとみることができる。なおこの結果、日銀のバランスシートの負債側で準備預金の供給は増えており、準備供給政策は続いている。
さらに先月、成長基盤強化支援貸付制度が導入された。総額最大3兆円を、成長基盤強化目的で融資を行う金融機関に0・1%で貸し出す。潜在成長率や生産性の引き上げを狙う供給側の政策であると同時に、設備投資などの需要を喚起する景気刺激策であるといえる。同制度には、政府系金融機関の政策金融の守備範囲を侵す、成長分野への資源配分は市場に任せた方が効率的だ、などの批判がある。
金融政策の今後の課題は何か。
第一に、信用収縮が収まっている半面デフレから脱却していない現状で、日銀は非伝統的金融政策の景気刺激的側面に期待した政策を継続していくべきだ。その効果は大きくないにしても、全くないわけではない。金融緩和を当面続けるという姿勢を市場に伝えることで、今回は明示的に行っていない時間軸政策と同じロジックにより、長期金利を低位に導くことができる。
第二に、この先日銀が行いうるデフレ脱却・景気刺激の追加策として長期国債の買い入れ増額をどう考えるかだ。単純な国債買い入れ増額は、準備供給政策の拡張にすぎない。これを超えるには、日銀が市場から国債を買い入れ、政府が同額の国債を発行することで、財政法で禁じられている日銀の国債引き受けを事実上行うしかない。その上で政府が支出すれば景気刺激効果が得られるうえ、確実にマネーストック(貨幣供給量)が増えるから、物価が上昇してデフレから抜け出すことができる(いわゆる「ヘリコプターマネー政策」、表の(7))。つまり準備供給政策を行ってもポートフォリオ・リバランス効果が表れない状況を完全にクリアできるわけだ。
だがこの政策には、政府と日銀の連携が必要だ。そして仮に日銀が単独で大量の国債を買い入れ始めたとすると、それは政府にこの政策を促すメッセージとなる。むろんその選択肢も厳然として存在する。しかし、それは先進国最大の政府債務残高をさらに増やし、克服に時間のかかるインフレを招くリスクを負うだけに、最後の手段ともいえる。実行するとすれば国民的合意が不可欠となるだろう。
たなか・たかゆき 57年生まれ。東大経卒、専修大博士。専門は財政金融政策、日本経済論
【表】財政金融政策の整理
政 策 景気刺激効果 金融システム安定化効果
(1)財政政策(公共投資、減税、給付) ○ ―
(2)伝統的金融政策(金利引き下げ) ○ ―
非伝統的金融政策
(3)準備供給政策(量的緩和) △ ○
(4)信用政策(信用緩和) △ ○
(5)時間軸政策(名目長期金利低下を狙った政策コミットメント) ○ ―
(6)インフレ期待形成策(実質金利低下を狙った政策コミットメント) ○ ―
(7)国債日銀引き受けによる財政拡張(ヘリコプターマネー政策) ○ ―
(注)(5)は日銀が2001~06年の量的緩和期に実施。(6)は1998年にクルーグマン教授が提言したが日銀は実施せず
非伝統的金融政策評価と展望(下)東短リサーチ加藤出氏(経済教室)
2010/07/09 日本経済新聞 朝刊
東短リサーチチーフエコノミスト加藤出氏
「成長基盤強化」は苦肉の策 手詰まり感、欧米でも 景気刺激へ骨太の議論を
ポイント
○米の準備預金急増したが銀行信用は増えず
○英国の量的緩和策、効果に懐疑的な声多く
○出口論は時期尚早だが次の危機へ備え必要
ユーロ危機や米国の雇用・住宅市場の回復鈍化などにより、超金融緩和策の出口政策が遅れるのではとの見方が世界的に強まっている。市場からは米連邦準備理事会(FRB)の追加緩和策の可能性を議論する声も聞こえ始めた。
とはいえ、既に多くの先進国の中央銀行は、短期金利をゼロ%近い水準に引き下げ、資金供給、資産購入でバランスシートは空前の規模に膨らんでいる。例えばFRBの資産規模はリーマン・ショック前の約2・6倍に達し、準備預金も平時の100億ドル前後から1兆ドル以上へ増大した。
非伝統的な金融政策を現時点でどう評価し、今後どうあるべきか、市場関係者との議論も踏まえ、以下で考えたい。
ニューヨーク市場で金融政策を分析する有力FEDウオッチャーらは、FRBの政策に対し(1)市場の混乱で金融商品の価格が異常に低くなった(アンダーバリュー)とき、中央銀行が介入し混乱の波及を防ぐ信用緩和策は効果があった(2)だがFRB幹部らがよく説明するように、準備預金増大を通じた量的緩和策が実体経済を刺激したか判然としない、と現時点で評価する。実際、FRBは現行政策を量的緩和策と呼ばれるのを拒んでいる。
米国の銀行信用(貸し出し、リース、証券購入など)は2007年は前年比10%前後の伸びを示していた。その後準備預金が急膨張したにもかかわらず急減が続き、最悪期からは回復したが、今年5月以降1~2%程度の減少を見せた(図)。一方食料・エネルギーを除くコア物価上昇率は著しく下落している。今年3月コーンFRB副議長(当時)が述べたように「銀行の行動はケインズが唱えた流動性のわなと整合的」といえる。
米銀はバランスシート調整に加え、様々な資本規制や総資産利益率(ROA)など経営指標への配慮も必要だ。一昔前の教科書的な説明と異なり、準備預金やマネタリーベース増大は銀行行動を積極化させる十分条件にならない。
昨年6~9月の米連邦公開市場委員会(FOMC)は、準備預金増大が逆に銀行の貸し出し意欲をそぐ懸念を議論していた。資本に対する総資産の比率上昇を抑えたい銀行は、FRBが資金供給で準備預金を増加させ続けると、どこかの段階で他の資産を圧縮する必要が出てくるからだ。
仮に景気が二番底に陥った場合、FRBは追加緩和策に悩むことになりそうだ。彼らは今は二番底懸念をメーンシナリオに置いていないが、今年3月に停止したモーゲージ担保証券(MBS)の買い取りを再開すれば、MBSの残存期間が長いだけに将来の出口政策は一段と困難になる。
昨年3月に開始した国債買い入れの効果がはっきりしないことから、FRBはこれを同10月に停止した。アジアの大口米国債保有者が、政府の借金を中央銀行が肩代わりするという「マネタイゼーション」に見えるとして、嫌ったことも影響したとの推測もある。FRBが国債購入を再開する場合は、“マネタイゼーション疑惑”が生じないように配慮する必要があろう。
非伝統的政策の政治的コストも無視できない。大胆な信用緩和策によるウォール街救済は、納税者負担を生む恐れがあり、有権者や議会の激しい怒りを招いた。バーナンキ議長の再任も一時危ぶまれ、FRBの独立性に制限を加える法案も活発に議論された。
欧州中央銀行(ECB)も準備預金増大の需要刺激に否定的な中で、唯一、世界で量的緩和策の看板を掲げたのがイングランド銀行(BOE)だ。BOEは昨年3月に国債買い入れを中心とする量的緩和策を開始した。筆者は5月下旬からロンドンに駐在しているが、シティー(金融街)では量的緩和策の効果に懐疑的な声が増えている。銀行貸し出しは停滞し、BOE自身もそれを認め始めている。「資産購入の規模と比べ広義のマネーサプライにほとんど変化はない」(マイルズ委員)との発言が幹部から出ている。
一方BOE幹部は、国債の大規模購入で、10年国債利回りと、翌日物金利の先行きを予想して取引する翌日物金利スワップ(OIS)の10年物ポンド建てレートのスプレッド(開き)が縮小した、つまり相対的に国債利回りが低下したと主張する。10年物OISレートは、今後10年の銀行間翌日物金利の市場予想を反映したもので、そこには期間や財政プレミアムは含まれていない。よってそのスプレッドはそれらのプレミアムの大きさを表すことになる。
確かにBOEの量的緩和策開始後、同スプレッドは大幅低下したが、昨年11月ごろから急拡大し、今年に入り量的緩和開始前の水準に戻った。現時点で国債買い入れの効果は不明確だ。
こうした中で、今後、日銀はどうあるべきか。既に銀行間市場は日銀が供給した余剰資金で「ジャブジャブ」だ。銀行間翌日物金利は0・1%という超低水準で、事実上下げ余地はない。欧米の中央銀行も翌日物金利をほぼゼロにする政策を避けている。利下げによる微々たる限界的な効果より、短期金融市場の資金再配分機能を消失させる点を彼らは懸念している。
またBOEの金融政策委員会は、短期金利をゼロにすると金融機関の収益を圧迫して、彼らのリスク許容力の改善を阻み、信用収縮の解消を逆に遅らせると説明する。
マッキノン米スタンフォード大学教授は、一段の利下げどころか現在FRBがつくり出した低金利環境でさえ、リスクに見合ったリターンが得られなくなり銀行の貸し出し意欲に悪影響を与えていると警告する(7月6日付米ウォール・ストリート・ジャーナル)。日本の場合、先行きの人口減や高齢化、財政問題、アジアなどとの競争激化といった将来不安が横たわるだけに、低金利政策による需要刺激は特に難しいだろう。
一方、日銀のバランスシートは既に異様に水膨れしている。09年の名目国内総生産(GDP)に対する中央銀行の6月下旬の総資産の比率は、日本が24%、米国が16%、ECBが24%、英国が18%と、ECBが追いついてきたが、日銀が長くトップであった。
また日本の銀行券発行残高は、超低金利の長期化を主因に他国に比べ圧倒的に巨大だ。20年前の1人あたり発行残高は26万円だったが、今年6月末は61万円と、米国の26万円、ユーロ圏の27万円、英国の11万円(いずれも円換算)をはるかにしのぐ。
日銀は「長期国債保有高は日銀券発行残高以内とする」とのルールを掲げているが、日銀券残高が巨額なため、日銀の国債購入も大規模である。6月下旬の長期国債保有高はGDP(09年)比で11%と、同14%のBOEより小さいがFRB(5%)やECB(1%)よりはるかに大きい。しかも米英は既に買い取りを停止した。日銀が今後も年間21・6兆円規模の国債購入を続けると数年後の保有高は日銀券発行残高に近づき、GDP比は16%前後になる。
それでも早期のデフレ克服がみえない点に、問題の難しさがある。厳しい財政状況の中で日銀が国債購入をさらに加速すれば、マネタイゼーションと見なされる恐れがでて、制御が困難になるだけに、熟考が必要だろう。
有効性があり、かつ持続可能な追加緩和策が現時点では見つからない中、日銀が先月導入を決めた、成長産業への金融機関の融資を日銀が支援する「成長基盤強化策」は、苦肉の策であろう。産業政策の領域は、本来、中央銀行の業務ではない。
だが前述のように、国債購入や準備預金増大による安定成長達成が困難と考えられる中、小手先の政策論ではなく日本の成長期待を高めるための議論を国民全体で行っていくことは非常に重要である。
また、現時点では効果に限りがある各国の中央銀行による大規模な流動性供給も、バランスシート調整が世界的に進めば、威力を発揮し始め、次の金融危機の火種になる恐れもある。出口政策の議論は時期尚早だが、金融的な不均衡が蓄積することはないか、注意を怠るべきではない。
かとう・いずる 65年生まれ。横浜国大経済卒。02年より現職


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