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「バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー ~1930年代編~」に怯え始めた世界2011/08/03 08:47



本ブログが繰り返してきた「バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー ~1930年代編~」。そのネタに英フィナンシャル・タイムズや米フォーリン・アフェアーズやポール・クルーグマンまでもが群がる今日。

バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャーの本格的な始まりは来年2012年と予測してきたものの、半年程早まった可能性も。東日本大震災が背中を押したのか。しかも、日米欧中“同時”政策機能不全な状態を英エコノミスト誌は日本化と揶揄。やはり日本がキーワードに浮上中。

1930年代に戻るとすれば、当然その先には1940年代シナリオも準備中? 締めを飾るメイン・イベントの主役はまたまた日本になるのか。いや、期待に応えるだけの破壊力など有していない日本は自ら不適格と宣言しておこう。

だとすれば、大役を担わされるのは・・・。1940年代再びの生贄となるのは・・・。
やはり中国しかない。米欧のチクチク刺激で中国のブチギレ大暴走となるのか。

日本は古臭いアジア主義に惑わされることなく米国の背後に寄り添う。下手に前に出ようものなら生贄ゲームに巻き込まれるだけ。米国と憲法九条を楯にしながら逃げ回ればいいのだ。


<関連記事引用>

▼ FT:景気下押し懸念に大揺れする市場
合意内容に辛口の評価、米国は1930年代の道をたどるのか?
http://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/17401

 ドイツ銀行のアラン・ラスキン氏は、提案された財政緊縮策の規模に着目している。

 「向こう5年間で実施される構造的な財政赤字の削減は、少なくとも、1930年代後半以降の『平時』に行われた緊縮策のどれよりも大きな規模になるだろう。そのため、景気が弱い中での財政引き締めは1937年の事例に似たものになる。当時は1936年から1938年にかけて財政赤字がGDP比で5%近く圧縮され、実質GDP伸び率が1938年に3%を超えるマイナスに落ち込んだ」


Worries over weak recovery quickly replace relief
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b9988ef2-bc56-11e0-acb6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1TugNshGa


▼ 1930年代の悪夢が再現されるのか ―― 高まる保護主義の脅威
リアクァト・アハメッド ピューリッツァー賞受賞作家
http://www.foreignaffairsj.co.jp/essay/201104/Ahamed

1930年代の教訓からみて、失業率が高止まりし、通貨供給、為替、財政政策上の選択肢が失敗するか、選択肢にならない場合、国は貿易障壁を作り出す可能性が非常に高い。・・・しかも、20世紀の初頭同様に、いまや世界はグローバル経済のリーダーシップをめぐる大きな移行期にある。アメリカのパワーは大きく弱体化し、ワシントンには、もはや単独でグローバル経済のリーダーシップを担う力はない。一方で、中国がリーダーシップを果たすとも考えにくい。輸出ばかりを重視する重商主義的な貿易アプローチをとっている限り、北京が困難な状況にある諸国からの輸出を受け入れる開放的市場の役目を果たすことはないだろう。G20もまとまりを欠いている。1930年代と現在の類似性が表面化しつつある。経済は回復しているが、失業率が高止まりし、多くの製造部門は過剰生産能力を抱え込み、通貨問題をめぐる緊張が高まりつつある。1930年代のような深刻で大規模な経済停滞に陥るリスクを回避できたと言うのに、現在の指導者が、1930年代の近隣窮乏化政策を今に繰り返すとすれば、悲劇としか言いようがない。


Currency Wars, Then and Now
How Policymakers Can Avoid the Perils of the 1930s
By Liaquat Ahamed
March/April 2011
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67472/liaquat-ahamed/currency-wars-then-and-now


▼ The Lesser Depression
By PAUL KRUGMAN
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22krugman.html

For those who know their 1930s history, this is all too familiar. If either of the current debt negotiations fails, we could be about to replay 1931, the global banking collapse that made the Great Depression great. But, if the negotiations succeed, we will be set to replay the great mistake of 1937: the premature turn to fiscal contraction that derailed economic recovery and ensured that the Depression would last until World War II finally provided the boost the economy needed.


Krugman: ‘We are repeating the mistakes of the 1930s,’ Value-added tax plausible solution
http://dailycaller.com/2011/08/01/krugman-we-are-repeating-the-mistakes-of-the-1930s-value-added-tax-plausible-solution/


Second time farce: That 30s feeling
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/08/second-time-farce


It’s 1937. No, it’s 1938! Or is it 1930? Talk About Lousy Choices… - MarketBeat
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/08/02/its-1937-no-its-1938-or-is-it-1930-talk-about-lousy-choices/


▼ America is merely wounded, Europe risks death
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/8673577/America-is-merely-wounded-Europe-risks-death.html

We can only pray that at least one half of the Atlantic system holds relatively firm. If both go down together, buy a shotgun and prepare for 1932.

コメント

_ Y-SONODA ― 2011/08/06 08:04


フィナンシャル・タイムズのGavyn Daviesも1930年代へバック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー。


<関連記事引用>

August 5, 2011 10:12 pm

Only luck and wise policy can save us from a double dip
By Gavyn Davies
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c971ad82-bf93-11e0-90d5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1U6i7m3PG

Global financial market confidence has collapsed, and visions of the 1930s are flooding back. Recession probability models are flashing red: some suggesting there is now more than a 50 per cent probability of America entering recession before the end of the year. The world’s advanced economies now need an unlikely combination of luck and wise policy to avoid a double dip.

Only a few months ago, economic forecasts were upbeat: the global economy seemed set for a third year of recovery following the great recession of 2008. So what went wrong? First, the contractionary effects of excessive private debt have continued to hold down household spending, especially in the US, the UK and the peripheral European economies. For a while last year it seemed that households had retrenched enough, when consumers’ expenditure started tentatively to rebound. This year, however, higher oil prices squeezed consumers while labour and housing markets stayed weak. Consumers lost confidence.

The weak underlying condition of household balance sheets means that even relatively minor shocks can knock consumers off their stride. But this has been made infinitely worse by a second factor: policymakers totally unable to cope with the stream of challenges thrown at them. It was one thing to come together to respond to the 2008 crisis. But having thrown all known weapons at it, and having just barely stabilised the situation, there is now no agreement on what to do next.

This state of indecision applies to the economics profession too. Many economists were willing to support the use of fiscal and central bank balance sheets to prevent a depression in the early days of the financial crisis, but there is now much concern about the risks of high public debt ratios, and the unprecedented current central bank holdings of that debt.

Most economists, and I am among them, still believe the most pressing concern is a shortage of demand, but there are legitimate worries about whether this can be fixed indefinitely by expanding public debt or direct monetary creation. There is also a vociferous group of anti-Keynesians, who think that such action is worse than useless. Many of us used to wonder how policymakers in the 1930s, and in Japan during its two lost decades, persuaded themselves it was impossible to address a chronic shortage of demand. Having lived through the past two years, their mistakes are easier to understand.

With economists divided and each side holding views with entrenched certainty, policymakers have fallen back on familiar orthodoxies, such as balancing budgets and normalising monetary policy. Some of this is understandable, given the inevitable uncertainties they face, but there have been big unforced errors.

The abject failure of the eurozone to conduct an elementary rescue operation during its sovereign debt crisis is a case in point. Germany says all options are on the table, except the one that would work, which is a greater issue of eurobonds. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France had a chance to explain this to chancellor Angela Merkel on the phone on Friday. Let us hope that he did so.

The other unforced error was the pantomime in Congress about the US debt ceiling. We needed an uncontroversial increase, along with a long-term plan for fiscal sustainability and some near-term, temporary, tax reductions. Instead we saw US politicians persuade investors that the strongest nation on earth, with its own currency, limitless taxable capacity and a credible central bank, might actually choose to default on its sovereign debt for political reasons. They finally stepped back from the brink, but not before severely shaking the world’s confidence in the ability of Washington to lead the global economy out of its malaise.

Now, the markets are looking once more at the Federal Reserve, which meets on Tuesday amid expectations that it will announce another round of quantitative easing. I doubt it is ready to do so. More worrying is the fact that many investors believe quantitative easing may at best be irrelevant in present circumstances. After all, US Treasury yields are already about 2.5 per cent. How much lower can they go? And would it matter very much if they did fall further? The nightmare scenario is the markets decide the global economy needs more help from policymakers, but the latter decide they have run out of ammunition, or are firing blanks.

So where are the escape routes? The first is that oil prices might fall, bringing down global inflation and boosting incomes. If this happened some of the forces that weakened the world economy earlier this year would then go into reverse, while central banks would be more willing to ease further. The second is that the corporate sectors of the developed economies, which are in rude health given the economic backdrop, may gradually pass their profits growth into extra employment and investment. They have been showing signs of doing this, but recent policy confusion threatens to damage business confidence. Friday’s slightly better jobs data from the US offer at least a few rays of hope.

The global economy stands on the brink of a double-dip recession. We now need leaders ready to prevent it from happening. If not, those images of the 1930s will quickly seem much less old-fashioned.

The writer is co-founder of Fulcrum Asset Management and Prisma Capital Partners

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