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政府紙幣とゲゼルマネー2009/01/14 00:49

シルビオ・ゲゼル


100年に1度あるかないかという事態に直面しておりますが、
私自身は「もうなるようにしかならんやろ&じたばたしてもしゃーない」派。

よって、何もしない、すなわち完全放置こそがベストの政策と信じて疑わないのですが、
100年に1度なのだから、そりゃも~いろんなアイデアや議論が出てきますよね。

このあたりをワクワクしながら観察している毎日。
どんな時でも楽しまなきゃ。

そして、来ました!
産経新聞編集委員の田村秀男氏がドカーンっとやってくれました。

いまこそ「100年に1度の対策」を
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/economy/finance/090112/fnc0901122048003-n1.htm

田村さんは「100年に1度の危機には100年に1度の対策を」として、
次の三つを提案しています。

(1)政府紙幣の発行
(2)相続税免除条件付き無利子国債の発行
(3)オバマ次期米政権から円建て米国債の引き受け

詳しくは記事をお読みいただくとして、
私が真っ先に注目したのは「政府紙幣」。

2003年にノーベル経済学賞受賞者のスティグリッツ教授が、
日本のデフレ克服策として「政府が紙幣を増刷すべきだ」と提唱し、
日銀や財務省と火花を散らしたことがありました。

財政赤字の制約を受けずに、思い切った政策を打てるわけですから、
今後世界各国で議論されることになるでしょう。
特に米国では政府紙幣復活もありうるかと。

ちなみに日本のテレビや新聞はほとんど無視しているのですが、
自民党を離党した渡辺喜美氏が麻生首相あてに提出した文書の中で、
政府紙幣に言及していることを皆さんしっかりと覚えておきましょう。

▼引用開始

渡辺喜美氏の文書要旨 早期に総選挙実施を
http://www.kobe-np.co.jp/knews/HK000328/0001641882.shtml

 自民党の渡辺喜美元行政改革担当相が麻生太郎首相あてに提出した文書の要旨は次の通り。

 世界の金融経済危機が進行しているのに、党は自由な言論を封殺している。麻生内閣の対応にはスピード感を持って建設的妥協を図る姿勢がみられない。定額給付金は「生活防衛」としてめりはりが失われた。衆院解散・総選挙を先送りしているところに国民の閉塞感の根本原因がある。今こそ為政者は党利党略を排し、国家国民のために命を燃やすべきだ。

 一、早期に衆院解散・総選挙を実施し、危機管理内閣を発足すべきだ。

 二、定額給付金を撤回し、財源の2兆円を地方による緊急弱者対策に振り向けるため、2008年度第2次補正予算案を修正すべきだ。

 三、国家公務員の人件費を来年度から2割削減すべきだ。

 四、公務員の天下りあっせんや(官僚OBが2回以上再就職する)「渡り」を容認している政令などを撤回すべきだ。

 五、国家戦略スタッフを官邸に配置し「経済危機対応特別予算勘定」を創設すべきだ。政府紙幣を発行し、財源とする。

 六、産業再生などのため「平成復興銀行」を創設。上場株式の市場買い取りを行う。

 七、「社会保障個人口座」を創設。納税者番号制度とセットで低所得者層への給付付き税額控除制度をつくる。

 提言が速やかかつ真摯に検討、審議されない場合、政治家としての義命により自民党を離党する。(1/5 19:22)

▲引用終了


緊急講演会が決定した森野榮一氏のブログでも産経提案のことが取り上げられています。

政府紙幣
http://a1morino.blogspot.com/2009/01/blog-post_13.html

「デフレに効果がある減価するマネーも政府紙幣なら導入しやすい。貨幣持ち越しに税をかけるわけだから、この課税分は発行したマネーの償却にあてることさえできる。」

この見解はゲゼル研究会を主宰している森野氏ならでは。

そして、今や全世界の金融マンが注目しているウィレム・ブイター。
先日紹介したようにイングランド銀行金融政策委員会(MPC)元委員で、
現在はロンドン・スクール・オブ・エコノミクス(LSE)教授。

このブイターは何度も何度もゲゼルマネーについて言及してきました。

講演会では世界経済と日本経済の分析とあわせて、
ゲゼルマネーについても語っていただく予定です。

シルビオ・ゲゼルはあのケインズから「未来はマルクスよりもゲゼルの精神から多くを学ぶであろうと信じる」と言わしめたほどの人物。
いよいよ真打登場となるのかどうか。

そして、2月21日(土)の午後に行われる森野氏講演会のタイトルは・・・・
「金融・経済危機脱出の途を探る~金融システム改革とゲゼルマネー」となる予定です。


<関連サイト>

ゲゼル研究会
http://www.grsj.org/index.html

流動性の罠を回避・脱出する方法
ウィレム・H・ブイター&ニコラオス・パニギルツォグロウ
http://www.grsj.org/book/book/ningennokeizai_first.html

ドル暴落の危機迫る!(ウィレム・ブイター)
http://y-sonoda.asablo.jp/blog/2009/01/12/4053674

<BGM>
After the Goldrush - Aoife Ní Fhearraigh
http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=gwjlbI3V6QM

キッシンジャーが描く米中による新世界秩序2009/01/14 09:05



絶妙のタイミングでやっぱり出てきたキッシンジャー。
この人らしい新世界秩序構想を語っております。
しかも、憎たらしいことに今再びエネルギー資源を持ち出すあたりはさすが。
奪い合いになるのが目に見えていますからね。

それにしても、この人は相当中国でいい思いをしたのでしょう。
中国を見習ったハニートラップ作戦が日本にも必要かも。
相手にトラップだと気づかせない中国の巧妙な手口がお見事ですなぁ(笑)



January 13, 2009
The Chance for a New World Order
By Henry Kissinger

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/01/the_chance_for_a_new_world_ord.html


As the new U.S. administration prepares to take office amid grave financial and international crises, it may seem counterintuitive to argue that the very unsettled nature of the international system generates a unique opportunity for creative diplomacy.

That opportunity involves a seeming contradiction. On one level, the financial collapse represents a major blow to the standing of the United States. While American political judgments have often proved controversial, the American prescription for a world financial order has generally been unchallenged. Now disillusionment with the United States' management of it is widespread.

At the same time, the magnitude of the debacle makes it impossible for the rest of the world to shelter any longer behind American predominance or American failings.

Every country will have to reassess its own contribution to the prevailing crisis. Each will seek to make itself independent, to the greatest possible degree, of the conditions that produced the collapse; at the same time, each will be obliged to face the reality that its dilemmas can be mastered only by common action.

Even the most affluent countries will confront shrinking resources. Each will have to redefine its national priorities. An international order will emerge if a system of compatible priorities comes into being. It will fragment disastrously if the various priorities cannot be reconciled.

The nadir of the existing international financial system coincides with simultaneous political crises around the globe. Never have so many transformations occurred at the same time in so many different parts of the world and been made globally accessible via instantaneous communication. The alternative to a new international order is chaos.

The financial and political crises are, in fact, closely related partly because, during the period of economic exuberance, a gap had opened up between the economic and the political organization of the world.

The economic world has been globalized. Its institutions have a global reach and have operated by maxims that assumed a self-regulating global market.

The financial collapse exposed the mirage. It made evident the absence of global institutions to cushion the shock and to reverse the trend. Inevitably, when the affected publics turned to their national political institutions, these were driven principally by domestic politics, not considerations of world order.

Every major country has attempted to solve its immediate problems essentially on its own and to defer common action to a later, less crisis-driven point. So-called rescue packages have emerged on a piecemeal national basis, generally by substituting seemingly unlimited governmental credit for the domestic credit that produced the debacle in the first place - so far without more than stemming incipient panic.

International order will not come about either in the political or economic field until there emerge general rules toward which countries can orient themselves.

In the end, the political and economic systems can be harmonized in only one of two ways: by creating an international political regulatory system with the same reach as that of the economic world; or by shrinking the economic units to a size manageable by existing political structures, which is likely to lead to a new mercantilism, perhaps of regional units.

A new Bretton Woods-kind of global agreement is by far the preferable outcome. America's role in this enterprise will be decisive. Paradoxically, American influence will be great in proportion to the modesty in our conduct; we need to modify the righteousness that has characterized too many American attitudes, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

That seminal event and the subsequent period of nearly uninterrupted global growth induced too many to equate world order with the acceptance of American designs, including our domestic preferences.

The result was a certain inherent unilateralism - the standard complaint of European critics - or else an insistent kind of consultation by which nations were invited to prove their fitness to enter the international system by conforming to American prescriptions.

Not since the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy half a century ago has a new administration come into office with such a reservoir of expectations. It is unprecedented that all the principal actors on the world stage are avowing their desire to undertake the transformations imposed on them by the world crisis in collaboration with the United States.

The extraordinary impact of the president-elect on the imagination of humanity is an important element in shaping a new world order. But it defines an opportunity, not a policy.

The ultimate challenge is to shape the common concern of most countries and all major ones regarding the economic crisis, together with a common fear of jihadist terrorism, into a common strategy reinforced by the realization that the new issues like proliferation, energy and climate change permit no national or regional solution.

The new administration could make no worse mistake than to rest on its initial popularity. The cooperative mood of the moment needs to be channeled into a grand strategy going beyond the controversies of the recent past.

The charge of American unilateralism has some basis in fact; it also has become an alibi for a key European difference with America: that the United States still conducts itself as a national state capable of asking its people for sacrifices for the sake of the future, while Europe, suspended between abandoning its national framework and a yet-to-be-reached political substitute, finds it much harder to defer present benefits.

Hence its concentration on soft power. Most Atlantic controversies have been substantive and only marginally procedural; there would have been conflict no matter how intense the consultation. The Atlantic partnership will depend much more on common policies than agreed procedures.

The role of China in a new world order is equally crucial. A relationship that started on both sides as essentially a strategic design to constrain a common adversary has evolved over the decades into a pillar of the international system.

China made possible the American consumption splurge by buying American debt; America helped the modernization and reform of the Chinese economy by opening its markets to Chinese goods.

Both sides overestimated the durability of this arrangement. But while it lasted, it sustained unprecedented global growth. It mitigated as well the concerns over China's role once China emerged in full force as a fellow superpower. A consensus had developed according to which adversarial relations between these pillars of the international system would destroy much that had been achieved and benefit no one. That conviction needs to be preserved and reinforced.

Each side of the Pacific needs the cooperation of the other in addressing the consequences of the financial crisis. Now that the global financial collapse has devastated Chinese export markets, China is emphasizing infrastructure development and domestic consumption.

It will not be easy to shift gears rapidly, and the Chinese growth rate may fall temporarily below the 7.5 percent that Chinese experts have always defined as the line that challenges political stability. America needs Chinese cooperation to address its current account imbalance and to prevent its exploding deficits from sparking a devastating inflation.

What kind of global economic order arises will depend importantly on how China and America deal with each other over the next few years. A frustrated China may take another look at an exclusive regional Asian structure, for which the nucleus already exists in the Asean-plus-three concept.

At the same time, if protectionism grows in America or if China comes to be seen as a long-term adversary, a self-fulfilling prophecy may blight the prospects of global order.

Such a return to mercantilism and 19th-century diplomacy would divide the world into competing regional units with dangerous long-term consequences.

The Sino-American relationship needs to be taken to a new level. The current crisis can be overcome only by developing a sense of common purpose. Such issues as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy and the environment demand strengthened political ties between China and the United States.

This generation of leaders has the opportunity to shape trans-Pacific relations into a design for a common destiny, much as was done with trans-Atlantic relations in the immediate postwar period - except that the challenges now are more political and economic than military.

Such a vision must embrace as well such countries as Japan, Korea, India, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, whether as part of trans-Pacific structures or, in regional arrangements, dealing with special subjects as energy, proliferation and the environment.

The complexity of the emerging world requires from America a more historical approach than the insistence that every problem has a final solution expressible in programs with specific time limits not infrequently geared to our political process.

We must learn to operate within the attainable and be prepared to pursue ultimate ends by the accumulation of nuance.

An international order can be permanent only if its participants have a share not only in building but also in securing it. In this manner, America and its potential partners have a unique opportunity to transform a moment of crisis into a vision of hope.

Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of State from 1973 to 1977.
Distributed by Tribune Media Services.